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9

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.A,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
y Case No.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
14010
N.A.,
Defendant-Respondent. J

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, First Security Bank (herein "First Security") seeks a judgment of $831,770 against the defendant
Zions First National Bank (herein "Zions") allegedly
caused by the inter-company transfer of certain assets
by Nuclear Controls and Electronics Corporation (herein
"Nuclear") being financed by First Security to Summit
International Corporation (herein "Summit") being financed by Zions.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Hon. Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., District Judge,
granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The
motion was supported by four depositions and three affidavits. The material facts are without dispute, and defendant's judgment should be affirmed by this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 6, 1972, Zions perfected a security interest in the inventory and accounts receivable of Summit, whose business was the purchase of hand calculators
manufactured by Nuclear and the nationwide sale of said
hand calculators (Tr. 16, 21, 23). By March 27, 1973,
the amount of financing extended by Zions to Summit
reached the sum of $1,100,000 (Tr. 17). Summit's place
of business was at 180 West 1950 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, and the offices of Nuclear were directly across the
street at 175 Weet 1950 South. After July 1, 1973, Summit and Nuclear were both wholly owned subsidiaries
of Trans-Atlas, a Washington corporation (Tr. 17; Heaton
Dep. 6).
On July 31, 1973, First Security perfected a security
interest in the inventory and accounts receivable of
Nuclear (Tr. 48, 51-55). On January 1, 1974, Nuclear
owed First Security the principal amount of $831,770.00,
as a result of consolidation of prior loans.
On September 7, 1973, the Board of Directors of
Trans-Atlas Corporation resolved "that the appropriate
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officers of the company and of Nuclear Controls and
Electronics and Summit International are authorized to
effect an inter-company sale of all aspects of the present
Nuclear Controls, calculator development and manufacture as well as all employees connected therewith, to
Summit International . . ." (Page 5 of Minutes attached
as Exhibit "A" to Saunders' deposition.) This inter-company transfer of inventory and assets from Nuclear to
Summit was made on the books of both corporations
effective as of January 1, 1974 (Tr. 17). Thereafter, the
three salaried salesmen employed by Summit (Saunders
Dep. 22) moved across the street into the building occupied by personnel of Nuclear (Tr. 18). At about May
28, 1974, book entries had been compiled for both corporations to show that the principal physical inventory
transferred by Nuclear to Summit as of January 1, 1974,
consisted of:
Cash Deposit at First Security
$
1,000.00
Merchandise inventory (finished
goods)
199,638.00
Prepaid expenses
3,713.00
Raw materials
1,295,182.60
Work in process
612,363.10
Fixed assets, plant and machinery ..
88,021.62
Fixed assets, molds
71,367.25
At this same date (1/1/74), Summit had accounts
receivable, none of which had been transferred by Nuclear
to Summit, in the amount of $2,397,968.09 (Tr. 36).
During the latter part of January, both banks were
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informed of the inter-company transfer by Nuclear to
Summit (Heaiton Dep. 11). Thereafter, Summit and
First Security conducted several meetings which resulted
in First Security, on February 12, 1974, taking a new
promissory note from Summit for $831,770.00 (Tr. 25)
and a new Inventory Financing Security Agreement and
a Security Agreement Covering Revolving Accounts Receivable (Tr. 26-30). After consultation with his corporate officers, Jerry Dearinger, attorney for Summit,
inserted into these security agreements the following
language:
INVENTORY FINANCING
SECURITY AGREEMENT
*

*

*

All collateral covered hereunder, especially
cash and noncash proceeds (including chattel
paper and accounts receivable) is subordinate to
and the terms and conditions hereof are limited
in application by a prior and superior security
interest in accounts receivable held by Zions
First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr.
5).
SECURITY AGREEMENT COVERING
REVOLVING ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
•

*

*

All collateral assigned to secured party hereunder and all terms and conditions hereof are
subordinate to and limited by the security interest in accounts receivable presently held by
Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah
(Tr. 4).
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The financing statement filed by First Security with
the Secretary of State's office similarly provided that it
covered:
All inventory and accounts receivable now owned
or to be acquired, not presently subject to security interest of Zions First National Bank (Tr.
6).
First Security did not notify Zions of its action in
taking the Note and Security Agreements of February
12, 1974, until August 16, 1974, when counsel for First
Security wrote to Zions and stated that First Security
claimed that it "has a lawful first priority with respect
to the inventory of Summit as well as inventory and
accounts of Nuclear, but perhaps has a priority position
second to Zions as to accounts receivable of Summit"
(Tr. 31). On September 17, 1974, First Security filed
an action against Zions claiming first priority in the inventory assets. This complaint was dismissed without
prejudice on September 19, 1974; then plaintiff filed the
present complaint on November 13, 1974 (Tr. 19).
The witness Leonard Geertsen, Controller and Treasurer of Summit, stated in his deposition (taken 12/9/74)
that the turnover of raw materials in the manufacturing
process into a finished hand calculator and the amounts
receivable to be collected upon would be somewhere between four and five times a year (Geertsen Dep. 17).
Wayne Saunders who had been Vice President of Nuclear
and later President of Summit testified: "By the time
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you receive the part, make it, sell it and receive the cash,
some would have come in within 60 days" (Saunders Dep.
42). Grant Beaton, Vice President of Trans-Atlas, stated,
"I think it would be fair to say that none of the items
that were involved in the transfer are here on the premises, with the exception of some obsolete and scrap items
that were scrapped off the production line" (Heaton Dep.
Tr. 22).
During the year 1974, Zions enforced the terms of
its Security Agreement to loan only 80% of the qualified
accounts receivable and 50% of the inventory (Tr. 21),
and reduced its indebtedness to $153,986.53 as of 1/13/75
(Tr. 19). All of the amounts which Zions had collected,
with one exception, has been from the collection of the
accounts receivable generated by sales of hand calculators by Summit (Tr. 93). On January 27 and 28, 1975,
Zions received $20,500 from a public sale of raw material
inventory and work in process at the premises of Summit
to Abatronix Corporation,, the highest bidder at such sale.
Summit has now closed its doors and is no longer in
business (Tr. 94).
ARGUMENT
The above facts fits into three or four different legal
theories as to why plaintiff's complaint was correctly dismissed, but the salient points to be noted at the outset
are:
1. Zions did not commit any wrong-doing against
the plaintiff; is not in privity of contract with it; is not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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charged nor is it guilty of any conversion of the assets
transferred by Nuclear to Summit.
2. There is no legal precedent, and none cited for
a complaint of this kind by plaintiff as a secured party
of Nuclear against defendant as a secured party of Summit.
• •.•• -y^.^M
3. Plaintiff ignored and waived its remedy under
the Bulk Sales Law to set aside the sale within six months
after discovery thereof (70A-6-111).
4. Zions has not been unjustly enriched because
Summit owned accounts receivable of $2,397,968.00 on
January 1, 1974, and there is still a balance owing to
Zions of approximately $155,000. The balance of these
monies were returned to Summit through the revolving
accounts receivable agreement, and lost to both banks
wholly and solely due to the failure of First Security to
advise Zions of the amount of its indebtedness and position taken by it on February 12, 1974.
POINT I.
FIRST SECURITY AUTHORIZED AND
RATIFIED THE SALE BY NUCLEAR TO
SUMMIT, THEREBY RELEASING I T S
LIEN OBTAINED AGAINST NUCLEAR.
The plaintiff's Complaint is based upon the Security
Agreements taken by it from Summit on February 12,
1974 (Tr. 1-5) which specifically provided that First
Security took a junior subordinate lien to the superior
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security interest in accounts receivable held by Zions.
(See Transcript, pages 4, 5 and 6.) However, the thrust
of plaintiff's argument on appeal is that it has a "perfected security interest in the transferred assets and in
all cash and non-cash proceeds arising therefrom" pursuant to 70A-9-306 (2). This statute and theory of plaintiff's claim was not alleged in its Complaint. This switch
of legal theory from alleging the Summit Security Agreements of 2/12/74 to relying upon the Nuclear Security
Agreements of 7/30/73 was never allowed by an Amended
Complaint, and it is important to note that the Complaint filed November 8, 1974, alleged that the Security
Agreements taken by plaintiff from Summit gave plaintiff an attached and perfected security interest in the
inventory and accounts receivable of Summit. (Paragraph
7 of Complaint, Tr. 2.)
The legal right of a secured party to assert its lien
on the disposition of its collateral is codified in 70A-9-306
as follows:
(2) Except where this chapter otherwise
provides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof by the debtor unless his action
was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor. (Emphasis
added.)
The text writers have stated: "Since the Uniform
Commercial Code does not state the manner in which a
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secured party may consent to the sale or disposition of
the collateral by the debtor it would seem that pre-Code
law in this regard will serve as a guide to results that
might be reached under the Code. Thus, consent to the
sale of collateral might be given orally, despite a provision
in the chattel mortgage or other security agreement prohibiting a sale without the written consent of the chattel
mortgagee or secured party." (69 Am. Jur. 2d Secured
Transactions Section 462; See also 14 C. J. S. Chattel
Mortgages, Section 262.) This doctrine that an authorization to the disposition of the collateral results in loss
of lien, by the "or otherwise" clause in 9-306(2) is made
clear by the draftsmen's comment to this section of the
Code. (Anderson U. C. C. Vol. 4, page 298.)
In many cases a purchaser or other transferee of collateral will take free of a security interest: in such cases the secured party's only
right will be to proceeds. The transferee will
take f r o whenever the disposition was authorized; the authorization may be contained in the
security agreement or otherwise given.
By requiring Summit to execute a new promissory
note for $831/770, without advancing any new money to
it, and taking two new security agreements, First Security authorized and ratified the sale of the Nuclear
assets to Summit. The only consideration for this note
and security agreements was the recognized ownership
of the transferred assets in Summit, and its concomitant
obligation to pay for the debt of Nuclear. The allegation
in plaintiff's Complaint (paragraph 7) that the Security

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
Agreements which Summit executed in favor of plaintiff
"give plaintiff an attached and perfected security interest
in the inventory and receivables of Summit" should
legally bar and estop plaintiff from now arguing that title
did not pass from Nuclear to Summit; that it has AN
ATTACHED AND PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST IN THE TRANSFERRED ASSETS, to-wit; under
the Security Agreements which plaintiff obtained from
Nuclear on July 30, 1973, prior to the transfer.
In First Finance v. Akathiotis, 110 111. App. 2d 377,
249 N. E. 2d 663, 6 U. C. C. Reporting Service 946, Pascal
Equipment Company supplied restaurant fixtures to
Akathiotis d/b/a Merchants Restaurant. The finance
company took a security agreement on the fixtures from
Pascal plus an assignment of its interest in the contract
payments to be made. The finance company failed to
notify Akathiotis of its assignment, and he paid Pascal
in full, who became insolvent. The finance company asserted its security interest against the fixtures which had
been sold and transferred. The Court held:
The sale to Akathiotis was not in violation of the
security interest taken by First Finance since
the contract of sale existed prior to the security
interest and at the time the security agreement
was executed First Finance had knowledge of
and acquiesced in the sale. This fact is evidenced
by the plaintiff having taken an assignment of
the contract of sale on the day prior to execution of the security agreement and by the financing statement filed by plaintiff with the Secre-
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tary of State in which specific reference to the
contract of sale is made:
*

*

*

This acquiescence in the sale by Pascal to
Akathiotis also constitutes an authorization of
sale, which under § 9-306(2) of the Code as
previously quoted, allowed defendant to take
free of the security interest created by his seller
in favor of First Finance.
In Re Vieths, Inc., 9 U. C. C. Rep. 943, is a case
arising in bankruptcy where the bank's security agreement was with Edwin J. Kuhn doing business under the
name "Vieths." The bank Med under the name "Kuhn"
because he had formerly been a sole trader, but later
Kuhn organized a corporation named Vieths, Inc. to
which he transferred all of his assets. After the transfer,
a new note was taken by the bank but no new security
agreement was executed by the corporation. The trustee
in bankruptcy prevailed against the bank to the accounts
receivable, because the bank was fully aware of the formation of the corporation and the transfer of assets, and
it accepted a new note by Vieths, Inc., the transferee.
The bank based its claim to priority on 9-306(2) of the
Uniform Commercial Code, but its lien was lost and did
not continue in the collateral because the transfer of
assets was done with its knowledge and ratification.
Two other cases which involve the sale of cattle covered by security agreements are United States v. Central
Livestock Ass'n., Inc., 349 F. Supp 1033, 11 U. C. C.
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Rep. 1054, and Clovis National Bank v. Thomas, 11 N. M.
554, 425 P. 2d 726, 4 U. C. C. Rep. 137. In the former
case, the court said:
In the interpretation of the foregoing statute (9-306-2), this court adopts the rationale
of Clovis National Bank v. Thomas, 77 N. M.
554, 425 P. 2d 726 [4 U. C. C. Rep. 137] (1967),
that under the Uniform Commercial Code, a
lender which permits its debtor to sell collateral
from time to time as the debtor chooses, and
relies upon the debtor to bring in the proceeds
from the sale, declining to exercise its right to
require the debtor to obtain written authority,
acquiesces in and consents to the sale and loses
its security interest pursuant to the "or otherwise" provision of § 9-306(2) U. C. C , thus
precluding any recovery on a conversion theory
against the purchaser. See also First Finance
Co. v. Akathiotis, 110 111. App. 2d 377, 249 N. E.
2d 663 [6 U. C. C. Rep. 946] (1969); Credit
Plan, Inc. v. Hall, 9 U. C. C. Rep. 514 (1971).
Other cases where the lien was lost by the secured party's
authorization of the sale through a course of dealing are
Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. Murray, (Iowa, 1973) 206
N. W. 2d 96, 12 U. C. C. Rep. 356 and Farmers National
Bank v. Ceres Land Co. v. Hoch, (Colorado, 1973) 512
P. 2d 1174; 12 U. C. C. 960. See also the annotation at
97 A. L. R. 646 eotitled Chattel mortgagee's consent to
sale of mortgaged property as waiver of lien. These oases
involve the same doctrine, but are prior to the adoption
of the Uniform Code.
First Security could have elected to set aside and
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disaffirm the transfer, or it could ratify it; it could either
claim under it or against it, but it could not do both;
and having adopted one course with knowledge of the
facts, it cannot afterwards pursue the other. See Hendricks v. Stark, 99 Fla. 277, 126 So. 293, citing 21 C. J.
1209-1210.
In this case, First Security brought suit on the Summit Security Agreements in November, eleven months
after the intercompany transfer of assets. It knowingly
permitted all of its raw materials to be manufactured
into calculators and sold by Summit without demanding
or receiving any of the proceeds from Summit.
The important matter is that First Security to this
date has not renounced, released or discharged the new
note and security agreements taken from Summit. It
made a considered judgment decision to take a new
promissory note from Summit, secured by a second lien
on the inventory and accounts receivable. The only legal
conclusion is that it authorized and ratified the intercompany transfer of assets, and its lien against those
assets perfected against Nuclear does not continue, by
the express wording of 70A-9-306 (2).
POINT II.
PLAINTIFF'S NEW SECURITY AGREEMENTS DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1974,
TAKEN FROM SUMMIT SPECIFICALLY
SUBORDINATED FIRST S E C U R I T Y ' S
LIEN TO THAT OF ZIONS.
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First Security's brief now claims that it has a perfected security interest in the transferred assets and in
all cash and non-cash proceeds arising therefrom. There
were no accounts receivable transferred from Nuclear
to Summit as of January 1, 1974 (Tr. 37), so this claim
pertains only to raw materials, inventory and work in
process. The new Inventory Financing Security Agreement executed by Summit in favor of First Security on
February 12, 1974, covers:
Raw materials, parts and work in process
involved in assembly of electronic calculators as
well as the finished goods inventory of calculators held for sale to customers.
*A11 collaterial covered hereunder, especially
cash and non-cash proceeds (including chattel
paper and accounts receivable) is subordinate to
and the terms and conditions hereof are limited
in application by a prior and superior security
interest in accounts receivable held by Zions First
National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah. (Emphasis added.) (Tr. 5.)
This language states in the most plain, unambiguous
manner that when the raw materials including those
transferred to Summit by Nuclear are manufactured into
electronic calculators, that the cash and non-cash proceeds are not security for First Security, but are to be
first paid and applied to the prior and superior security
interest in accounts receivable held by Zions. Not only
did First Security authorize and ratify the sale from
Nuclear to Summit, by taking the new note and security
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agreements, but it specifically contracted to take a junior
and subordinate lien to that of Zions, The conclusion
is inescapable that First Security was content to take
a second lien on the inventory until it appeared that
Summit was failing in business and could not pay the
prior lien of Zions, No claim is made that First Security
was defrauded or that it has a legal reason to now be
relieved of its contract which specifically states that
when the inventory was converted into cash proceeds, the
saine belonged to Zions. First Security filed its Complaint based on the Summit security agreements. Plaintiff's brief argues that the filing of the Summit financing
statement "was done for the purpose of giving the public
additional notice of First Security's security interest in
the transferred assets." (Page 10 of Appellant's Brief.)
This gave constructive notice to Zions that First Security
had ratified and authorized the sale. Wayne Siaundears
was President of Summit at the time he signed the new
note for $831,770 and the new Security Agreements taken
by First Security on 2/12/74. (Saunders Dep. 3.) He
testified on deposition:
A: The simple fact is I read this document
and when I signed it I signed it with the understanding and knowledge that Zions First National Bank had first right to all inventories,
collateral and accounts receivable, and that First
Security Bank was in a subordinated position.
That was my understanding of what I signed.
Q: Do you know who you had conversations with that led you to that understanding?
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A: No. I did not have conversations that
led me to that understanding. I did not discuss
that with anyone at the Bank. I arrived at
that conclusion based on what I read. That was
my interpretation of what I read. (Saunders
Dep, 27.)
Neither the cross examination of Mr. Saunders, nor
the affidavit filed by plaintiff contradicts this testimony.
We repeat that the First Security Inventory Financing
Security Agreement said that, "All collateral covered
hereunder, especially cash and noncash proceeds (including chattel paper and accounts receivable) is subordinate
to and the terms and conditions hereof are limited in
application by a prior and superior security interest in
accounts receivable held by Zions First National Bank,
Salt Lake City, Utah."
This language covers the inventory which was transferred; i.e., the "transferred assets" as argued in Appellant's Brief. It does not limit itself to the legal conclusion that Zions was first because Zions had a prior secured position in the inventory. It says that when the
transferred assets became converted into cash proceeds,
these monies were security for a prior and superior security interest in accounts receivable held by Zions. The
bench and bar should be able to reach the same conclusion as to the interpretation of this language as easily
as Wayne Saunders, the President of Summit.
POINT III.
AS A MATTER OF LAW FIRST SECURITY
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IS ESTOPPED TO CLAIM THAT IT HAS
PRIORITY OVER ZIONS.
The fact is undisputed that Summit had accounts
receivable of $2,397,968 on January 31, 1974. None of
these receivables were transferred by Nuclear to Summit
(Tr. 37). Zions managed to reduce its debt from $1,100,000 as of January 1, 1974, to approximately $155,000 to
date. Transcript page 24 shows on the back of Zions'
note that the first reduction of $100,000 on the $1,100,000
note was not achieved until June 19, 1974, and by December 3, 1974, the indebtedness was still $596,998.03,
From January 31 to August 31, the accounts receivable
shrank from $2,397,968 to $954,084 (Tr. 37) (the difference is $1,452,884), and only $100,000 was paid and applied on the indebtedness of Zions. Zions was not notified of the claim to a first priority by First Security until August 16? 1974. Noall Bennett, Vice President of
Zions, stated in his affidavit that, "At the time of said
transfer (as of 1/1/74), Nuclear owed First Security
Bank the sum of $831,770 as a result of consolidation of
prior loans, but I didn't know it at that time" (Tr. 18).
"First Security Bank did not notify Zions of its action
in taking a Note (Exhibit "D") and the above Security
Agreements (Exhibits "E" and "F") from Summit until
after August 15, 1974, When Zions received a copy of
letter from attorney Don B. Allen representing First Security Bank." (Paragraph 10 of the Affidavit, Tr. 19.)
If First Security thinks that the fact is material to
this lawsuit that Zions had prior notice or knowledge of
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the claim now made by plaintiff, it should have presented
such fact to the trial court. Furthermore, affidavits opposing a Motion for Summary Judgment are required by
Rule 56(e), U. R. C. P. to be made on personal knowledge. The rule states:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts
as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify in the matters stated therein.
The affidavit filed in opposition to defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment states:
Zions had prior notice, or was informed very
soon thereafter, of the said transfer of inventory
and other assets from Nuclear to Summit. (Paragraph 9, Tr. 48.)
•

*

*

In February, 1974, FSB (Firat Security)
was assured by officers of Nuclear and Summit
that FSB had first priority position on inventory
and assets transferred by Nuclear to Summit,
and that Zions understood this to be the case.
(Paragraph 13, Tr. 49.)
In addition to statements by officers of
Nuclear and Summit as above mentioned, your
affiant has other reasonable basis for believing
that shortly after the said transfer, Zions was
specifically advised of FSB's security interest in
said inventory. Zions had notice and knowledge
of FSB's claimed first priority position in that
inventory transferred from Nuclear to Summit
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well before Don B. Allen's letter of August 16,
1974, referred to in the Affidavit of Noall J.
Bennett. (Paragraph 14, Tr. 49.)
Zions made no effort to refute FSB's claim
of first priority on the inventory and other
assets transferred from Nuclear to Summit until several months after Zions became aware of
said claim. (Paragraph 15, Tr. 50.)
These hearsay statements based on undisclosed conversations with unnamed officers have no probative value
and should be disregarded. Jefferson Construction Co.
v. U. S., 283 F. 2d 265; Dressier v. M. V. Sandpiper, 331
F. 2d 130; Sprague v. Vogt, 150 F. 2d 795; Banco de
Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, N. Y., 114 F. 2d 438.
It is readily apparent that the above vague statements
were not made on personal knowledge, to which affiant
is competent to testify. There was no one other than
First Security who could tell Zions that the Security
Agreements taken on February 12, 1974, did not mean
what they said, to-wit: that all cash proceeds from the
inventory were limited in application by a prior and
superior security interest in accounts receivable held by
Zions. There is a complete omission of any communication by First Security to Zions prior to August 16, 1974,
the date attorney Don Allen wrote his letter (Tr. 31).
The record stands uncontradicted that there was no prior
notification of First Security's action to Zions; that it
had taken a new note, and new security agreements,,
which said that First Security's lien was subordinate to
a prior security interest of Zions, BUT, nevertheless First
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Security claimed that it was first.
This Court should take judicial knowledge of the
fact that banks do evea^fthing possible to collect from a
debtor whose assets as of January 1, 1974, were in excess
of Four Million Dollars and by February 10, 1975, had
closed its doors and gone out of business (Tr. 94). The
indebtedness to general unsecured creditors is more than
Two Million Dollars. The failure of First Security to
notify Zions of the new note of $831,770 and security
agreements taken by it from Summit permitted a sum
in excess of One Million Dollars in cash receivables to
be returned to Summit, which sum was lost in its operations ($1,452,000 less $100,000 paid June 19, 1974, to
Zions, less an estimated 20% loss in bad debts). For
this reason, Zions filed a counterclaim against First Security that:
If plaintiff for any reason should prevail
as to its claim of a first priority in the inventory
and accounts receivable of Summit, its conduct
of failure to notify this defendant of its discovery
of the bulk transfer and reversing its position
as to the plaintiff being suibordinate to the defendant in the collateral of Summit has damaged this defendant by any sums or amounts
payable on its loan, with interest thereon, which
this defendant will be unable to collect from
Summit. (Paragraph 10, Tr. 11.)
Zions did not rely on First Security's act in taking a second and subordinate security agreement, but if it had
been aware that Summit owed this much secured debt,
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which was claimed to be prior to Zions, it could have
shut down Summit's operations in February, 1974, and
taken all of its receivables which at that time wefle $2,262, 406. If First Security had given timely notice to
Zions, both banks could have recovered full payment.
A principle of law to be applied to this situation is:
In order to work an estoppel, "silence most be under
such circumstances that there are both a specific opportunity and a real apparent duty to speak; or as otherwise expressed: If a man is silent when he ought to
speak, equity will debar him from speaking when conscience requires him to keep silent." (Hendricks v. Stark,
99 Fla, 277, 126 So. 293, citing 10 R. C. L. 692; 1 Wiltsie
on Mortgages, 4th Ed. 167, Section 117.
CONCLUSION
The parol evidence rule bam plaintiff from testifying
or claiming at any trial that the new note and security
agreements which it took from Summit, the transferee,
did not, as a matter of law, say that plaintiff's inventory
collateral, "especially cash and noncash proceeds/' is
subordinate to a prior and superior security interest in
accounts receivable held by Zions. Furthermore, the case
is governed squarely by First Finance v. Akathiotis and
In Re Vieths, Inc., supra, which hold that the taking of
a new note, or security agreements from the transferee
confirms, ratifies and authorizes the sale and disposition
of the collateral by Nuclear to Summit, and therefore
plaintiff's lien in the inventory of Nuclear does not con-
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tinue.
The decision of this Court would be a significant interpretation of 9-306(2) of the Uniform Commercial
Code, if it rested on the undisputed ratification of transfer argued in Point I of Respondent's Brief. The new
security agreements show so conclusively as a matter
of law that the defendant has no liability to the plaintiff,
that plaintiff-appellanit does not discuss their specific
language whatsoever in its Brief.
Respectfully submitted,

CALLISTER, GREENE
& NEBEKER
Richard H. Nebeker
Attorneys for
Defendant-Respondent
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